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Aggravated Identity Theft is Only Punishable
Under Federal Statute if the Accused Knew that the
Identification Information he Employed Actually
Belonged to Another Individual: Flores-Figueroa v.
United States
UNITED STATES-AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT-STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION-KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT-The United States
Supreme Court held that for a defendant to receive an additional
two-year prison sentence under the federal aggravated identity
theft statute, the government must prove that the defendant knew
that the identification information he used actually belonged to
another individual.
Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009).
1. THE FACTS OF FL ORES...................................... 146
HI. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF FL ORES................. 146
III. FL ORES AT THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES................................................ 148
A. Issue on Certiorari................................. 148
B. Justice Breyer's Majority Opinion.............. 148
C. Justice Scalia's Concurrence.................... 152
D. Justice Alito's Concurrence...................... 153
IV. THE CIRCUIT-SPLIT OVER THE KNOWLEDGE
REQUIREMENT PRIOR To FL ORES......................... 154
A. The Fourth Circuit: Crounsset................. 155
B. The Ninth Circuit: Beachem.................... 155
C. The Fourth Circuit: Montejo.................... 156
D. The Eleventh Circuit: Hurtado................. 157
E. The Eighth Circuit: Intra-District Conflict..158
F The First Circuit: Estrada-Sanchez ........... 161
G. The First Circuit Reverses Estrada ............ 163
H. The Ninth Circuit: Miranda-Lopez............ 163
V. THE IMPACT OF FLORES AND THE FUTURE ............. 165
A. Successful Statutory Interpretation ............ 166
B. Public Policy Success ............................ 167
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................... 170
145
146 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 48
1. THE FACTS OF FL ORES
The Petitioner, Ignacio Flores- Figueroa, a citizen of Mexico, en-
tered the United States equipped with a falsified Social Security
number and alien registration card in order to bypass immigration
employment restraints.' Flores gave the documents, which identi-
fied him by his real name, to his employer in 2006.2 However, the
identification numbers on the credentials matched information
that belonged to other individuals registered in the United
States.3
II. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF FL ORES
Upon receipt of the documentation, Flores's employer notified
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 4 The United States
prosecuted Flores in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa. 5 Flores pled guilty to two counts of
misuse of immigration documents and one count of entry into the
country without inspection. 6 Flores also pled not guilty to two
counts of aggravated identity theft and proffered the defense that
1. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1889 (2009). Flores also provided
a false name, birth date, Social Security number, and alien registration card to his em-
ployer in 2000. Flares, 129 S. Ct. at 1889. Although Flores gave false information to his
employer in both 2000 and 2006. the 2000 information was completely fictitious and thus
not an issue under the aggravated identity theft statute. Id. Flores was employed by L &
M Steel Services, Inc. during the 2006 incident. United States v. Flores-Figueroa, 274 F.
App'x 501, 501 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev'd, 129 5. Ct. 1886 (2009).
2. Flores, 129 S. Ct. at 1889.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Moares, 274 F. App'x at 502.
6. Id. at 501. Entering the country without inspection occurs when an alien:
(1) [E]nters or attempts to enter the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by immi-
gration officers, or (3) attempts to enter or obtains entry to the United States by a
willfully false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material
fact ....
8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006).
Also, misusing immigration documents occurs when:
[a person] knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, or falsely makes any immigrant or
nonimmigrant visa, permit, border crossing card, alien registration receipt card, or
other document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of
authorized stay or employment in the United States, or utters, uses, attempts to use,
possesses, obtains, accepts, or receives any such visa, permit, border crossing card,
alien registration receipt card, or other document prescribed by statute or regulation
for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States,
knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made, or to have been pro-
cured by means of any false claim or statement, or to have been otherwise procured
by fraud or unlawfully obtained ....
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (2006).
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because the government failed to establish that he knew that the
information on the falsified documents actually belonged to an-
other person, all of the elements of the crime were not satisfied
and therefore did not warrant conviction. 7 The district court
found Flores's contentions unpersuasive and sentenced him to
fifty-one months in prison for the two admitted crimes, along with
an additional twenty-four-month mandatory incarceration for ag-
gravated identity theft. 8
Flores appealed the aggravated identity theft conviction to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and again
asserted that the prosecution failed to establish the knowledge
requirement. 9 The government responded that the term "know-
ingly," as used in the statute, only applied to the first set of verbs
in the statute: "transfers, possesses, or uses."10 Conversely, Flo-
res argued that the knowledge requirement not only applied to the
verbiage, but also to the expression "of another person" and thus
compelled the prosecution to demonstrate that the accused had
knowledge that the information unlawfully used corresponded to a
real person."
The court of appeals, following their precedent in United States
v. Mendoza- Gonzalez,'12 concluded that the knowledge requirement
only controlled the verbs in the statute and not through the end of
the statute to the phrase "of another person."13 Ultimately, by
adhering to the Mendoza decision, the court of appeals decided
that the government was not required to show that Flores knew
7. Flores, 274 F. App'x at 501-02. The federal aggravated identity theft statute reads:
'Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c),
knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification
of another person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years." 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006). Entering the
United States without inspection and misusing immigration documents were included in
the underlying "enumerated felonies" and would support the additional two year sentence if
applicable. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c).
8. Mlores, 274 F. App'x at 502. Flores was sentenced to seventy-five months in prison
total. Id.
9. Id. The government's exact contention, as described by the court of appeals, was
that the aggravated identity theft statute "requires the Govemnment to prove that a defendant knew
that the means of identification belonged to another person." Id
10. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)).
11. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)).
12. 520 F.3d 912, 914-16 (8th Cir. 2008) vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2377 (2009). The Mendoza
court concluded, "we find that the plain language of § 1028A(a)(1) limits 'knowingly' to
modifying 'transfers, possesses, or uses' and not 'of another person.' Thus, we conclude that
§ 1028A(a)(1) is unambiguous and that the Government was not required to prove that
Mendoza-Gonzalez knew that Gurrola was a real person.."Mendoza-Gonzales, 520 F.3d
at 915.
13. Miores, 274 F. App'x at 502.
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that the information used on the employment documents actually
matched that of another person and upheld the aggravated iden-
tity theft conviction.14
III. FLORES AT THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
A. Issue on Certiorari
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari due
to a split in the circuits over the interpretation of the statutory
provision at issue.15 The Court faced the question of whether the
aggravated identity theft law compelled federal prosecutors to
prove that a defendant had knowledge that the identification in-
formation unlawfully utilized actually and already corresponded
to another person.16 Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the
Court and concluded that the statute required such a knowledge
element.17
B. Justice Breyer's Majority Opinion
The Court began its multiple-front attack on the government's
position with a simple review of ordinary English language rules.'18
The majority found the government's contention that the term
"knowingly" only applied to a portion of the statute's language un-
persuasive, and believed imposing an additional two-year sentence
on an individual who did not have knowledge that the identifica-
tion information belonged to another person was senseless.' 9 Eng-
lish grammar, as Justice Breyer noted, normally treats an adverb
(" knowingly" in this case) as modifying not only verbs that follow
it, but also the subject of those verbs.20 The Court continued that
the adverb tells the reader how the whole act was accomplished
(with "knowledge" in this case), including the object of the sen-
14. Id.
15. Flores, 129 S. Ct. at 1889.
16. Id. at 1888. The requirement that the defendant know that the identification in-
formation belongs to an actual person is contrasted with the situation where the identifica-
tion is completely forged. Id. at 1889. Completely forged identification occurs when there
is "a group of numbers that does not correspond to any real Social Security number." Id.
17. Id. Along with Justice Breyer, Chief Justice Roberts as well as Justices Stevens,
Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg joined in the majority opinion. Id.
18. Id. at 1890 (majority opinion).
19. Id.
20. Flores, 129 S. Ct. at 1890.
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tence.21 The majority agreed that although the sentences could be
construed otherwise, the Court's interpretation was the "normal"
view in light of average English usage.22 Examples showing a dif-
ferent result were not easily discoverable by the Court, which ac-
knowledged that such differing interpretations were normally due
to atypical contexts or other linguistic clues.23
The majority's second reason for reversing Flores's conviction
for aggravated identity theft was the fact that average construc-
tion of criminal laws coincided with the normal English usages
detailed above.24 Specifically, the Court opined that when the
term "knowingly" precedes the components of a crime, the term is
interpreted as modifying every component thereafter. 25 The Court
noted numerous examples in accordance with this rule of interpre-
tation and observed that the prosecution provided no persuasive
examples to the contrary.26
Justice Breyer then presented the third reason for reversing the
lower courts, denouncing an intricate challenge from the prosecu-
21. Id. The majority listed numerous examples to further their point. Id. "[Ilf the
bank official said, 'Smith knowingly transferred the funds to the account of his brother. .. '
[and] if the bank official later told us that Smith did not know the account belonged to
Smith's brother, we should be surprised." Id. Also, "[ilf a child knowingly takes a toy that
belongs to his sibling, we assume that the child not only knows that he is taking something,
but that he also knows that what he is taking is a toy and that the toy belongs to his sib-
ling." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1891. "As Justice Alito notes [in his concurrence], the inquiry into a sen-
tence's meaning is a contextual one." Id.
24. Plores, 129 S. ct. at 1891.
25. Id. The Court detailed examples of where such a rule of interpretation was applied.
Id. The Court previously interpreted a federal food stamp statute that said, "whoever
knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in
any manner not authorized by [law]" is subject to imprisonment. Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419, 420 (1985) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1)). The Court held that the word
"knowingly" applied to the phrase "in any manner not authorized by [law]." Liparota, 471
U.S. at 433. The interpretation in Liparato stood even in the face of the legal maxim "igno-
rance of the law is no excuse." Mlores, 129 S. Ct. at 1891.
26. FMores, 129 5. Ct. at 1891. The majority supported their position with another
example as well. Id. The Court interpreted the statute that made it illegal for "[amny per.
son who.(1) knowingly transports or ships using any means or facility of interstate or for.
eign commerce by any means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if-(A)
the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct." United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68 (1994) (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)(A)). The Court decided that the term "knowingly" modified the
phrase "the use of a minor." X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 69. The language at issue in X-
Citement Video "was more ambiguous than the language [in flares] not only because the
phrase 'the use of a minor' was not the direct object of the verbs modified by 'knowingly,'
but also because it appeared in a different subsection." Flares, 129 S. Ct. at 1891 (citing X-
Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 68-69). Also, the interpretation in X-Citement Video was ac-
complished even though "many sex crimes involving minors do not ordinarily require that a
perpetrator know that his victim is a minor." Id.
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tion incorporating another section of the statute at issue.27 The
Court noted that a related crime described by the statute allowed
aggravated identity theft to occur with terrorism violations. 28 The
Court also identified that the prosecution alleged that Flores's in-
terpretation of the statute at issue would render a portion of the
terrorism provision, which read "of another person," irrelevant. 29
To that effect, the Court observed that the terrorism portion ap-
plies to one who "knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without
lawful authority, a means of identification of another person or a
false identification docitment.130
The government's argument with respect to this provision, the
majority opined, reduced to four steps. 31 Step one of the govern-
ment's theory reminded the Court that it should not construe a
statute in a way which "makes some of the language superflu-
ous."3 2 The second step stated that a person who knows that he is
using a "means of identification" illegally must know that the
document either belongs "to another person" or is a "false identifi-
cation document" because no other alternatives exist.3 3 The third
step explained that requiring the accused to possess knowledge
that the "means of identification" was "of another person" would
render meaningless the corresponding provision in the terrorism
statute.34 The final step cautioned that the Court should not con-
27. Flares, 129 S. Ct. at 1892.
28. Id. The statute is closely analogous to the law at issue, but punishes a person who
"knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification
of another person or a false identification document." Id. (quoting § 1028A(a)(2)).
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting § 1028A(a)(2)) (emphasis added to show the addition to the terrorism
provision that is not present in the section at issue in Flores).
3 1. Id.
32. Flares, 129 S. Ct. at 1892. Extending the knowledge requirement throughout the
entire offense would, as the government contended, apply the statute to "one who 'know-
ingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification
knowing that it belongs to another person or is a false identification document."' Brief for
the United States at 14, Flares, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 2009 WL 191837 (No. 08-108) (quoting
United States v. Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008) (Bybee, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
33. Mlores, 129 S. ct. at 1892. The only way an actor can perform the actions unlaw-
fully is to have, in the government's opinion, knowledge of one of the two scenarios. Brief
for the United States, supra note 32, at 12-16.
34. Flares, 129 S. Ct. at 1892. If the actor was required to have knowledge not only of
his action, but also that the means of identification were used in an unlawful manner, then
there would be no point in reiterating that the two scenarios at the end of the offense had to
be performed with knowledge as well. Brief for the United States, supra note 32, at 12-14.
The government furthered that subjective knowledge of illegality on the part of the actor,
as advocated by Flares's construction of the statute, already implies that the person per-
forms the actions either knowing that the identification belongs to another person or is
falsified. Id.
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strue the same phrase ("of another person") in two related sections
of the same statute incongruently. 3 5
The majority quickly rejected the government's intricate textual
challenge because of two substantial flaws.36 Primarily, the sec-
ond step of the government's argument, identifying the two possi-
ble classes of knowledge, was incomplete because there were other
conceivable options for knowingly procuring an unlawful use of a
"means of identification. 37 Also, even if the circumstances identi-
fied by the government were the only two options, there would be
no reason to reiterate them both at the end of the terrorism stat-
ute.3 8 The Court, using their own interpretation of the govern-
ment's textual contentions, determined that the terms had a
meaningful place in the statute even under Flores's construction
of the offense and were not superfluous.39
Furthermore, the majority considered whether the legislature
intended the breadth of the statute to even punish those who were
unaware that the identification information belonged to a real
person.40 Although the history of the law was substantially incon-
clusive, the majority pointed to instances that supported either
side at least slightly. 41 The Court uncovered some reports from
the House of Representatives that failed to distinguish "identity
theft," which is using the information of another, from "identity
fraud," which is simply using fictitious information.42 The Court
explained that treating the terms interchangeably suggested that
the statute at issue was drafted to apply even without knowledge
that the information belonged to another person, but the offenses
eventually found segregated places in the enacted statutes them-
selves.43
35. Flares, 129 S. Ct. at 1892.
36. Id.
37. Id. "One could, for example, verbally provide a seller or an employer with a made-
up Social Security number, not an 'identification document,' and the number verbally
transmitted to the seller or employer might, or might not, turn out to belong to another
person. The word 'knowingly' applied to the 'other person' requirement (even in a statute
that similarly penalizes use of a 'false identification document') would not be surplus." Id.
38. Id.
39. Flares, 129 S. Ct. at 1892.
40. Id. Justice Breyer described those actors without knowledge that the information
already belonged to a real person as "those who do not intend to cause this further harm" of
using an existing person's identification. Id.
41. Id. at 1891.
42. Id. at 1892-93.
43. Id. at 1893. The majority found that a nearby section of the statute at issue, 18
U.S.C. § 1028, included "fraud" in the title, while the section at issue in the case used "iden-
tify theft" in its title. Id.
Winter 2010 151
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Finally, the majority noted the practical barriers to proving be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the requisite knowl-
edge to be guilty of aggravated identity theft.44 Often, the Court
observed, the illegal immigrant does not care whether the infor-
mation detailed on his paperwork already corresponds to another
person or is otherwise completely fictitious.4 5 Thus, even if en-
forcement barriers arise, the majority reinforced that such diffi-
culties would still not prevail over the clear language of the stat-
ute.46
In the end, the Court found the government's contentions un-
persuasive when compared to the normal English meaning of the
language and general statutory interpretation.47 Justice Breyer,
writing for the majority, concluded that the aggravated identity
theft statute at issue required the government to prove that Flores
had knowledge that the identification information he utilized be-
longed to another individual.48 Consequently, the Court reversed
the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for
additional proceedings. 49
C. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia concurred in the overall result reached by the ma-
jority, but believed that the result could have been reached with
less judicial inquiry.50 He agreed that the knowledge requirement
extended not only to the verbs, but also to the phrase "of another
person."51 In his opinion, however, this result could have been
reached solely through analysis of the English language, and the
majority overstepped their judicial bounds by relying on other
sources for support beyond the clear statutory wording. 52
44. FMores, 129 S. Ct. at 1893.
45. Id. Justice Breyer stated that it was relatively easy to prove knowledge in normal
identity theft cases, as opposed to immigration cases, such as stealing information to access
another's bank account or instances of dumpster diving. Id.
46. Id. at 1893. The Court was unable to "find indications in statements of [the stat-
ute's] purpose or in the practical problems of enforcement sufficient to overcome the ordi-
nary meaning, in English or through ordinary interpretive practice, of the words that [Con-
gress] wrote." Id. at 1894.
47. Id. at 1894.
48. Id.
49. Kores, 129 S. Ct. at 1894.
50. Id. at 1894 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia was joined by Justice Thomas.
Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. 'The statute's text is clear, and I would reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals on that ground alone." Id. at 1895.
152 Vol. 48
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The majority stated that courts normally apply the term know-
ingly, which introduces the components of a crime, to every por-
tion of the offense. 53 Justice Scalia reasoned that such a proce-
dure may have been followed by the majority of courts when con-
struing criminal statutes, but the practice was in no way the con-
trolling rule for interpretation. 5 4 The majority's support for their
suggestion of such a rule, United States v. X-Citement Video,
Inc.,55 was wrongly decided in Justice Scalia's eyes and incorrectly
relied upon by the majority in this case. 56 In X-Citement Video,
the concurrence contested, such a rule could not apply because the
legislature expressly and cautiously restricted the reach of the
knowledge requirement. 57 Furthermore, Justice Scalia refused to
support the use of the history of the legislation to legitimize the
interpretation because the weight of such information was ques-
tionable at best. 58
D. Justice Alito's Concurrence
Justice Alito also wrote a separate concurring opinion in which
he agreed with the final disposition of the case, but only agreed
with part of the majority's rationale.59 He was concerned that the
majority's reasoning could be construed as promulgating an in-
flexible rule of interpretation for statutes.60 Justice Auito believed
that examples which did not coincide with the rule were readily
available and that context was actually the element that con-
trolled the scope of "knowingly" in the usual English sentence. 61
Also, Justice Alito pointed out that the wording of a criminal code
53. Id. at 1891 (majority opinion).
54. Mlores, 129 S. Ct. at 1894 (Scalia, J., concurring).
55. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64.
56. Flores, 129 S. ct. at 1894 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia believed that the
majority in X-Citement Video wrongly "converts the rule of interpretation into a rule of law,
contradicting the plain import of what Congress has specifically prescribed regarding
criminal intent." X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 8i (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. Mlores, 129 S. Ct. at 1894.
58. Id. at 1894-95.
59. Id. at 1895. (Alito, J., concurring).
60. Id. Justice Alito suspected that "the Court's opinion will be cited for the proposition
that the mens rea of a federal criminal statute nearly always applies to every element of the
offense." Id.
61. Id. Justice Alito expanded his analysis with an example stating "[tihe mugger
knowingly assaulted two people in the park-an employee of company X and a jogger from
town Y.' A person hearing this sentence would not likely assume that the mugger knew
about the first victim's employer or the second victim's home town." Id.
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is far from the linguistic construct used to convey a similar knowl-
edge element in everyday speech. 62
Justice Alito proposed a revised rule that allowed a court to be-
gin with the broad proposition that the knowledge requirement
pertained to each portion of the crime.63 He qualified the new rule
with the insistence that there would be times when context could
defeat such a supposition.64 The government, the concurrence
noted, failed to identify any such context to support their conten-
tions and that the government's mode of interpretation in practice
would produce abnormal results.65
Finally, the government's theory of restricting the scope of the
knowledge requirement only to the verbs in the offense would base
the additional two-year prison sentence, in Justice Alito's view,
predominantly on chance.66 Overall, Justice Alito departed from
the majority's rationale to the extent that it adopted a strict rule
of statutory construction, but still agreed with the underlying re-
versal of Flores's conviction for aggravated identity theft.67
1V. THE CIRCUIT- SPLIT OVER THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT
PRIOR TO FL ORES
Flores was the culmination of decisions following Congress's en-
actment of the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act ("Act") 68
in 2004 to counter mounting anxiety due to the identity theft epi-
demic.69 The Act introduced the offense at issue in Flores, "aggra-
vated identity theft," which mandated incarceration extensions in
62. Flores, 129 S. Ct. at 1895 (Alito, J., concurring). "For example, a speaker might say:
'Flores- Figueroa used a Social Security number that he knew belonged to someone else' ...
."Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. For example, federal law makes it unlawful to transport a minor with intent to
engage such minor in criminal sexual activity. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (2006)), The
statute provides: "A person who knowingly transports an individual who has not attained
the age of 18 years ... "Id.). Courts of Appeals consistently applied the statute without
regard to whether the defendant knew the victim's age. Id. at 1895-96.
65. Id. at 1896.
66. Id. Justice Alito stated that "[ilf it turns out that the number belongs to a real
person, two years will be added to the defendant's sentence, but if the defendant is lucky
and the number does not belong to another person, the statute is not violated." Id.
67. Flores, 129 S. Ct. at 1896 (Alito, J., concurring).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2006).
69. 81 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 113, § 10 (2009). The amendment established, inter
alia, penalties for the newly created crime of aggravated identity theft. Id. Aggravated
identity theft had two variations. Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act § 2. A manda-
tory two-year prison sentence will be added to an underlying offense for aggravated identity
theft normally, while a five-year sentence is added for violations with regards to terrorism
offenses. Id.
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addition to the prison term attached to conviction for underlying
enumerated crimes.70
A. The Fourth Circuit: Crounsset
Two divergent views emerged as to the interpretation of the
term "knowingly" in the statute, which created a split in the cir-
cuits and among district courts as to the breadth of the knowledge
requirement. 71 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia initiated the judicial schism when faced with
the issue in United States v. Crounsset.72 The court decided that
the statute only required the government to show that the infor-
mation on the passport used by the defendant was fraudulent, not
that the defendant knew that the information actually belonged to
another person.73 Interpreting the statute in any other manner
would, in the District Court's opinion, add another requisite ele-
ment for conviction that was not expressed in the plain statutory
language. 74 District Judge Ellis presided over the case and also
looked at the practical enforcement implications of expanding the
knowledge requirement. 75 Ultimately, the court realized that such
an expansion of the knowledge element created the possibility of
an insuperable barrier for conviction.76
B. The Ninth Circuit: Beachem
The inter-circuit battle lines were quickly drawn as the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington ar-
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1-2).
71. See Flores, 129 S. ct. at 1889. The Court in Flores "granted certiorari to consider
the 'knowledge' issue-a matter about which the Circuits have disagreed." Id.
72. 403 F. Supp. 2d 475 (E.D. Va. 2005) (mem.). In Crounsset, the defendant entered
the United States from Buenos Aires, Argentina at Dulles International Airport. Crouns-
set, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 476. The defendant presented a Dominican Republic passport with
his picture on it, but used the name and identification information of Sandy Garcia. Id.
Suspicions arose as the defendant's stories did not add up and an electronic fingerprint
scan through the FBI database finally revealed that the defendant was traveling under
falsified information. Id. at 477. Further investigation revealed that the defendant had
twice been removed from the country and banned from entering the United States without
permission for a twenty-year period. Id.
73. Crounsset, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 483. Illegal reentry of an illegal alien under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a) was a predicate offense to support the additional prison term for aggravated
identity theft. Id. at 480-81 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(10)).
74. Id. The court denied defendant's motion for acquittal on the aggravated identity
theft count. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. Such enforcement difficulties were discounted by the Supreme Court. Mlores,
129 S. Ct. at 1894.
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rived at a different conclusion in United States v. Beachem on the
same day that Crounsset was decided."7 The court faced the issue
of the accurate construction of the aggravated identity theft of-
fense.78 District Judge Pechman presided and concluded that the
statute compelled the government to prove that the accused knew,
at the time of the offense, that the information in question be-
longed to another person.79
After reviewing the legislative history, the court found that
Congress expressly planned to allow for courts to levy increased
punishments against individuals who stole identities.8 10 Generally,
Judge Pechman agreed that the offense of theft included the in-
tent to deprive another.81 The District Court saw no reason to
abandon this well-established mens rea requirement of theft in a
federal statute aimed at averting stealing. 82 Applying the mens
rea for theft to the statute at issue, the court determined that the
prosecution must establish that the defendant had knowledge that
the identification he used already belonged to another person.83
C. The Fourth Circuit: Montejo
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit joined the diver-
gence in United States v. Montejo.84 The only issue on appeal from
a conviction for aggravated identity theft was whether the defen-
dant needed specific knowledge that the identification numbers he
used belonged to another person.85 The Fourth Circuit ruled that
77. 399 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2005). Beachem, like Crounsset, was decided on
November 21, 2005. Beachem, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 1156; Crounsset, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
78. Beachumn, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. Beachem was slightly different factually from
the immigration-based cases because Tammy Beachem was an American citizen who was
accused of using Social Security numbers to open up bank accounts under false identities.
Id. at 1157. The numbers turned out to belong to living people in the United States. Id.
79. Id. at 1156-57, The defendant claimed that the Social Security numbers were arbi-
trarily generated. Id. at 1157.
80. Id. at 1158.
81. Id. (citing United States v. Montejo, 353 F. Supp. 2d 643, 654 (E.D. Va. 2005)).
82. Beachem, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.
83. Id. at 1157-58. The defendant's Motion to Dismiss was still denied because the
prosecution possessed circumstantial evidence that could satisfy the knowledge require-
ment. Id. at 1158. The possibility of satisfying all the elements of the statute raised a
question of material fact, so the preliminary motion had to be denied. Id.
84. 442 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 879 (2006), abrogated by FMores-
Figueroa, 129 S.Ct. 1886.
85. Montejo, 442 F.3d at 214. The defendant in Montejo claimed not to know that the
Alien Registration and Social Security numbers he used to gain employment in the United
States were already assigned to another person. Id. at 214-15. He did know that the num-
bers were not his own because he purchased the documents for sixty dollars in Phoenix,
Arizona shortly after he crossed the border from Mexico. Id. at 214.
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to violate the statute and support a conviction of aggravated iden-
tity theft, the defendant need not have knowledge that the infor-
mation was assigned to another individual.86
The court began its analysis by reviewing well-established
grammatical rules.8 7 Circuit Judge Widener explained the reason-
ing of the court and stated that proper English demanded that the
adverb "knowingly" be in as close proximity to the words it alters
as possible. 88 Also, the court maintained that simply by placing
"knowingly" in front of a long predicate did not extend the modifi-
cation through the remainder of the text.89
Judge Widener reviewed cases which construed similar statutes
to support the court's contention that the knowledge requirement
was restricted.90 Finally, the court determined that the statute
was unambiguous and the legislative history identified the goal of
allowing an enhanced penalty for aggravated identity theft. 91 The
court concluded that by allowing conviction irrespective of the de-
fendant's knowledge of whether the information he used belonged
to another person, both the legislative intent and proper rules of
grammar were satisfied. 92
D. The Eleventh Circuit: Hurtado
The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Hurtado espoused
slightly different rationale.93 When faced with the issue of the
knowledge requirement in the aggravated identity theft statute,
86. Id. at 217.
87. Id. at 215. MonteJo was the first time the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was
required to construe the federal aggravated identity theft statute. Id. at 213-14.
88. Id. at 215.
89. Id.
90. Montejo, 442 F.3d at 216. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 76 F.3d 596, 601 (4th
Cir. 1996) (construing a drug offense which began with "knowingly").
91. Montejo, 442 F.3d at 217. Without ambiguity, the court refrained from applying the
rule of lenity. Id. The rule of lenity is a "judicial doctrine holding that a court, in constru-
ing an ambiguous criminal statute . . . should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more
lenient punishment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1449 (9th ed. 2009).
92. Montejo, 442 F.3d at 217.
93. 508 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), cert. denied., 128 S. Ct. 2903 (2008),
abrogated by Flores.Figueroa, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009). The defendant Hurtado was arrested
following a meeting to review his passport application, which was filed under a fraudulent
name. Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 604-05. Suspicions mounted during the interview as the de-
fendant failed to correctly answer various questions and after being informed that it was a
crime to lie to federal agents, Hurtado admitted that he was using a false name. Id. at 605.
Upon a search at the time of arrest, the defendant possessed a driver's license, bank debit
card, library card, and paycheck all issued under the alias Hurtado used to apply for a
passport. Id. The defendant even registered and insured an automobile under the fraudu-
lent name. Id.
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the per curiam opinion agreed with the emerging majority and
held that the offense did not require the prosecution to prove that
the defendant had knowledge the information he utilized was al-
ready assigned to another person. 94
The court reasoned that if the legislature wished to expand the
requisite knowledge to the entire text, it easily could have added
that the identification had to be "known to belong to another ac-
tual person."95 Enlargement of the knowledge requirement, in the
court's opinion, would allow a defendant to fraudulently exploit
the identification information of another during the commission of
another underlying offense.96 The perpetrator could escape en-
hanced penalization for such conduct as long as he remained igno-
rant as to whether the information actually belonged to another.97
In the end, the Eleventh Circuit solidified its place in the judicial
tug-of-war by refusing to require the government to prove that the
defendant knew that the information belonged to another person
under the aggravated identity theft statute.98
E. The Eighth Circuit: Intra-District Conflict
Even courts within individual circuits had difficulty determin-
ing the exact treatment of "knowingly" in the statute.99 In United
States v. Salazar-Montero,100 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Iowa laid the basis for intra-circuit chaos
in the Eighth Circuit when it faced the knowledge issue in late
2007.101 The district court ruled that knowledge was required for
every portion of the statute, including whether the information
belonged to another person.102 The court disagreed with the gov-
94. Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 610.
95. Id. at 609. Because the adverb "knowingly" was placed directly in front of the verbs
"transfers, possesses, or uses," the court held that the modifier applied to the verbs and not
the subsequent language of the statute. Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 471 F. 3d 535,
539 (4th Cir. 2006)).
96. Id.
97. Id. The court stated that the plain meaning of the statute did not warrant such a
reading. Id.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Salazar-Montero, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Iowa 2007)
(mem.), abrogated by United States v. Mata-Lara, 527 F. Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Iowa 2007).
100. Salazar, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
101. Id. at 1083. The defendant possessed a Social Security card, IRS Individual Tax-
payer Identification Number card, and a North Carolina Driver's License. Id. at 1082. The
Social Security number was already assigned to another person. Id.
102. Id. at 1094. The decision was rendered in response to the defendant's Motion for
Legal Ruling on the Elements of the Offense Charged under the Federal Rule of Evidence
12(b)(2). 1d. at 1082.
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erment's contention that the mens rea requirement applied only
to the means of identification and not to whether the information
belonged to another person. 03 Judge Bennett presided and agreed
that a majority of courts, along with at least three cases within
the district, followed the restricted knowledge requirement urged
by the prosecution, but still declined to follow the majority view.'104
Explanations from other jurisdictions were not satisfactory to
the court in Salazar and Judge Bennett determined that no man-
datory authority in the Eighth Circuit existed yet. 105 A plain lan-
guage approach swayed the court even further from the govern-
ment's argument and the court found that the knowingly element
appeared to apply to the entire predicate because it was placed as
close as possible to it. 108
Next, the court echoed the sentiments of Beachem and acknowl-
edged that theft normally required intent to deprive another. 07
Judge Bennett explained that one cannot intend to divest another
person of his property unless the perpetrator has knowledge that
such property does indeed belong to another person. 08 Further-
more, the district court believed that the statute was written with
the intention of providing additional repercussions for aggravated
identity theft, in contrast to only fraudulent action. 09
Finally, Judge Bennett recognized that there was more than one
possible reading of the statute, especially because different courts
had already reached varying interpretations."10 Ambiguity, the
court noted, triggered various statutory interpretation tools not
103. Id. at 1083. The government also asserted that other courts, including an apparent
agreement from the Eighth Circuit, had held that the restricted view of the knowledge
requirement should be applied. Id. at 1085-86.
104. Id. at 1082-92.
105. Id. at 1089-91. The court in Salazar believed that the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. Hines, 472 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2007), only determined that a showing that the
defendant had knowledge that the means of identification belonged to another person
would satisfy the statute, not whether such knowledge was necessarily required. Salazar,
520 F. Supp. 2d at 1088-89. The Hines case was cited by the government to bolster its
contention that the Eighth Circuit would most likely agree with their limited view of the
knowledge requirement. Id. at 1085.
106. Salazar, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1091-92. The court found no reason to subdivide the
predicate. Id. at 1092.
107. Id. at 1092.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1092-93. Legislative history, in the court's opinion, reflected a concern for
theft, as opposed merely for fraud. Id.
110. Id. at 1093. General rules of statutory interpretation required the court to look at
the plain language of the statute first. Id. at 1086. If ambiguity is present, then the court
held that the overall statutory structure, history and congressional intent may be refer-
enced. Id. at 1087.
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readily employed for perfectly clear statutes, including the rule of
lenity."' Ultimately, the District Court concluded that the defen-
dant must know that the means of identification belonged to an-
other person before he can be convicted of aggravated identity
theft."12
Salazar was short lived as the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit reviewed the knowledge requirement again in United
States v. Mendoza- Gonzalez in early 2008.113 Circuit Judge Gru-
ender wrote for the court and determined that the knowledge re-
quirement of the aggravated identity theft statue did not reach
the language of the entire statute as Salazar concluded. 114 The
prevailing view in the circuit became that the government did not
have to prove that the defendant knew the information belonged
to another person. 115
The court initially constrained itself to a plain language review
of the statute, especially because the statute was viewed as unam-
biguous."16 Under the "last antecedent rule," Judge Gruender ex-
plained that qualifying words and phrases only modify other
words immediately before or after them in the sentence."17 The
modification, Judge Gruender continued, did not extend to other
areas of the language which were more remote in textual dis-
tance."18 Within such grammatical framework, the court believed
that the immediacy of the word "knowingly" to the verbs of the
statute evidenced Congress's intention that the adverb only alters
the close-by verbiage."19 The court therefore refused to extend
"knowingly" throughout the entire statute. 20
Going further, the Eighth Circuit believed that the same re-
stricted view of the knowledge requirement would prevail even if
sources besides the plain language of the statute were con-
111. Salazar, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
112. Id. at 1094.
113. Mendoza, 520 F.3d at 912. The defendant presented his employer with a false
Social Security and photographic identification card. Id. Immigration and Customs En-
forcement Agents raided the pork processing plant where the defendant worked and
charged him with various immigration and identity theft offenses. Id. at 914.
114. Id. at 915.
115. Id. The defendant's convictions, which included aggravated identity theft, were
affirmed. Id. at 913.
116. Id. at 915.
117. Id.
118. Mendoza, 520 F.3d at 915.
119. Id. at 915-16.
120. Id. at 916. The court would not look beyond the plain language analysis because
the statute was unambiguous and only used other resources to solidify the conclusions. Id.
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suited. 21 Judge Gruender noted that although the Supreme
Court of the United States had extended the term "knowingly"
before to terms which were in further proximity within similar
criminal laws, such an extension was only performed due to the
fear of penalizing completely innocent conduct. 22 Punishment of
an innocent person was not a concern to the court in Mendoza be-
cause the judges believed that because an underlying offense was
required for an aggravated identity theft conviction, the accused
already performed non-innocent conduct. 23 Finally, through the
Mendoza decision, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
calmed any uncertainty within the circuit as to the reach of
"knowingly" in the statute and held that the term only applied to
"transfers, possesses, or uses" and not "of another person." 24
F. The First Circuit: Estrada-Sanchez
The jurisdictional tensions intensified as new cases, such as
United States v. Estrada-Sanchez,25 brought previously silent dis-
tricts into the mens rea debate. 26 In Estrada, Federal District
Court in Maine faced a defendant's motion to dismiss a criminal
indictment for aggravated identity theft. 27 The motion was based
on the grounds that the government could not prove that the de-
fendant knew the permanent resident and Social Security cards
he used belonged to another person. 28 In denying the motion, 29
the court, through District Judge Woodcock, decided that the
knowledge requirement did not extend to the defendant's aware-
ness of whether the information already corresponded to another
individual. 30
121. Id.
122. Id. at 917.
123. Mendoza, 520 F.3d at 914-15 (quoting i8 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(i)).
124. Id. at 915.
125. 558 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Me. 2008).
126. Estrada, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 130. The defendant was indicted by a federal grand
jury for various criminal violations including aggravated identity theft, possession of
fraudulent immigration documents and Social Security fraud. Id.
127. Id. at 133 n.2.
128. Id. at 133.
129. Id. at 136. The district court also determined that the defendant's possession of an
illegal permanent resident card was a predicate felony to support aggravated identity theft.
Id. at 132.
130. Id. at 130. Judge Woodcock recognized that the defendant's contention in his Mo-
tion to Dismiss, mainly that the knowledge requirement applied to the entire statute, was
the minority view. Id. at 133. Case law in other jurisdictions and district court decisions
within the First Circuit supported a restricted view of the reach of the mens rea. Id. at
133-34.
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As a question of first impression in the First Circuit, the district
court highlighted that previous judiciary divergences were based
on adherence to three focal points of disagreement. 1 3' The first
judicial view, as pinpointed by the court in Estrada, concentrated
on the consequences for the victim and the purpose of the statute
overall. 8 2 Judge Woodcock, considering the fact that the victim
was harmed irrespective of the thief s knowledge, concluded that
Congress set out to deter identity theft through increased legal
penalties for perpetrators. 3 3
The second authoritative view discovered by the court centered
on fairness to the defendant. 34 Under this view, Judge Woodcock
found that because some jurisdictions determined the statute to be
ambiguous, the government should be required to establish more
elements before the increased punishment could be imposed. 35
In the final approach identified by the court, the aggregate
statutory scheme was examined. 36 The district court believed
that the lawmakers understood possession of another person's
identification during the commission of another predicate crime
created a separate and higher risk than mere possession without
other illegal conduct, warranting increased punishment. 37
After considering all three views, Judge Woodcock agreed with
the conclusion of a coordinate district court within the jurisdiction
and concluded that the knowledge element did not apply to the
defendant's knowledge regarding whether the fraudulent informa-
tion he retained actually corresponded to another person. 38
131. Estrada, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 133-36. "Courts have marshaled impressive gram-
matical arguments to support their conclusions." Id. at 134.
132. Id. at 134.
133. Id. The court also acknowledged that the knowledge requirement would raise a
significant evidentiary hurdle for the government to overcome before conviction. Id. Ex-
ceptional circumstances, as the court noted, would he needed before such proof could be
established. Id.
134. Id. at 134-35.
135. Id. at 134. Judge Woodcock believed that unfairness could arise if an enhanced
mandatory prison sentence was imposed on someone without the requisite knowledge. Id.
at 135.
136. Estrada, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 135.
137. Id. at 136. The increased risk, as the court stated, was felt by both society and the
individual victim. Id.
138. Id. at 136. The court agreed with Judge Hornby in United States v. Godin. Id. at
133, 136 (citing United States v. Godin, 489 F. Supp. 2d 118, 119-21 (D. Me. 2007)). Judge
Hornby instructed the jury that "[tihe government is not required to prove that [the defen-
dant] knew the means of identification actually belonged to another person." Godin, 489 F.
Supp. 2d at 120.
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G. The First Circuit Reverses Estrada
The consensus among the district courts in Maine was subse-
quently reversed when the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
determined that the mens rea requirement for aggravated identity
theft extended to "of another person." 139 In United States v.
Godin, 40 the court of appeals employed all available statutory con-
struction devices, but was unable to determine the legislative in-
tent. 141 Without being able to determine the breadth of the knowl-
edge requirement through interpretation, the court concluded that
the language remained ambiguous. 42
Senior Circuit Judge Tashima writing for the court also found
that the statutory structure, the title of the offense, and legislative
history could not settle the ambiguity. 43 With ambiguity remain-
ing, the court felt compelled to resolve the uncertainty in the de-
fendant's favor under the rule of lenity.144 Eventually, the court
held that the knowledge requirement extended to the entire sub-
section of the statute. 45 A breaking point of judicial divisions over
the construction of the statute was recognized by the court and
Judge Tashima stated that the Supreme Court might find a solu-
tion for the vital question of statutory interpretation. 4 6
H. The Ninth Circuit: Miranda-Lopez
The day before the First Circuit Court of Appeals sorted out the
interpretive issues within its circuit, the Ninth Circuit was faced
with the identical issue of whether the defendant must know that
139. United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
1028A(a)(1)). The First Circuit determined that Judge Hornby had instructed the jury in
error while Godin was at the district court level. Godin, 534 F.3d at 61. The defendant's
conviction was reversed because the government failed to prove that the accused knew the
means of identification belonged to another person. Id. at 53-54.
- 14 1.Godin, 534 F.3d 51. For instance, the court found that because they were 
in-
terpreting a criminal statute instead of an English textbook, ordinary grammar was not
satisfactory in determining the best or even most likely reading of the statute. Id. at 56-57.
142. Id. at 61.
143. Id. at 53, 61. The court stated that "[t~he rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal
laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them." Id. (quoting United
States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008)).
144. Id. at 61.
145. Id.
146. Godin, 534 F.3d at 65. "In the end, the Supreme Court may resolve this important
question of interpretation of the [aggravated identity theft] statute." Id. In the alternative,
the court believed that Congress might be prudent in clarifying the scope of the increased
penalties under the aggravated identity theft offense with new legislation. Id.
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the information he used belonged to another person in United
States v. Miranda-Lopez.47 The Ninth Circuit in Miranda held
that proof of the falsity of the documentation used was not
enough. 48 According to the court of appeals, the statute required
that the defendant knew the means of identification he employed
already belonged to another person to support the additional ag-
gravated identity theft penalties. 49
In so holding, Circuit Judge Silverman maintained that it was
possible to interpret the statute as only extending the knowledge
requirement to a portion of the text.' 50 Although possible, Judge
Silverman asserted neither logic nor grammar made such a con-
struction the sole conclusion.' 5' Furthermore, it was not unrea-
sonable, in the court's opinion, to extend the knowledge require-
ment to the entire offense. 52 Even when the court applied the
statutory history, the wording remained ambiguous. 53 The court
resolved the ambiguity, as many sister courts did, in favor of the
defendant under the interpretive rule of lenity. 54 In the end, the
government was required to show knowledge for every element of
the statute, which the court noted was not an impossible barrier to
conviction. 155
147. 532 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). The issue, as stated by the court, was: "[D]oes
the adverb 'knowingly' in the statute modify 'of another person' or merely 'transfers, pos-
sesses or uses?"' Miranda, 532 F.3d at 1038.
148. Miranda, 532 F.3d at 1035. The defendant in Miranda was a citizen of El Salvador
who had been previously deported from the United States. Id. Border Patrol in California
noticed that the resident alien cards presented did not match the three individuals, includ-
ing the defendant, in a car attempting to pass into the United States. Id. at 1035-36.
149. Id. at 1035. The defendant claimed that he fell asleep in an acquaintance's car
after a night of alcohol consumption and did not wake up until he arrived at the Border
Patrol Station. Id. at 1036. He stated he had no intention to reenter the country nor did he
claim the resident identification card as his own. Id. Customs and Border Patrol Officer
Terence Gibbs testified that the defendant was awake and alert and did indeed claim the
resident card as his own. Id.
150. Id. at 1035, 1038.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Miranda, 532 F.3d at 1038-39.
154. Id. at 1040. The rule of lenity was applied because the court believed that the reso-
lution would not conflict with the intent of Congress. Id. The case was reversed and re-
manded for reconsideration of the defendant's post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal
to allow each party to argue whether the knowledge requirement was actually satisfied. Id.
at 1041.
155. Id. at 1040-41. Judge Bybee, during the dissenting portion of his separate opinion,
proffered the theory used in the complex and confusing four-step approach by the govern-
ment in Flores. Miranda, 532 F.3d at 1042-43 (Bybee, J., dissenting). The dissent noted
that when the knowledge requirement was read into the nearby terrorism provision for
aggravated identity theft, the phrase "knowing that it belongs to" is superfluous. Id. at
1042 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(2) (2006)). "A person who knowingly transfers a means
of identification without lawful authority must necessarily know that the identification
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V. THE IMPACT OF FL ORES AND THE FUTURE
After a five-year journey of interpretation throughout the judi-
cial circuits of the United States, there was still not a consistent
interpretation of the aggravated identity statute.156 Finally, the
matter reached the Supreme Court and the ultimate arbiter of
interpretive matters definitively extended the knowledge re-
quirement to the entirety of the statutory language. 57
Cases from the two diverging views contained strikingly similar
fact patterns, identical issues, and analogous arguments to Flores,
but reached exactly opposite conclusions throughout the federal
circuits. The difficulties surrounding the aggravated identity theft
offense are the perfect example of how statutory construction is
truly a matter of interpretation. 5 8
The Court was faced with a difficult question on an issue that
would have widespread ramifications for Americans, immigrants,
and the government alike. Difficult and divisive statutory conun-
drums have become natural territory for the Court. 59 Such situa-
tions are often included under the legal maxim "[h]ard cases make
bad law,"' 60 but the Court effectively avoided the generality in Flo-
res. Even when faced with a difficult issue and a clear split of cir-
cuits, the Supreme Court arrived at the correct decision and es-
poused "good" law. Flores was successful for two primary reasons.
First, the Court's decision mended a troubled textual issue that
confused and divided many courts with similar statutes in the
past. Second, the ruling comported with sensible public policies,
including fairness and the notion that convictions should be based
on fault or wrongdoing, instead of mere chance.
either belongs to another person or that it is false; there are no other choices. It makes no
sense to read into subsection (a)(2) the second 'knowing."' Id. at 1042 (Bybee, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Bybee believed that such a reading was unnecessary and even reached the
realm of absurdity. Id. The majority rebutted the dissent by stating that the language was
simply used to distinguish the aggravated identity theft sections from one another. I1d. at
1040 n.5 (majority opinion).
156. See Godin, 534 F.3d at 65.
157. Mlores, 129 S. Ct. at 1894 (2009).
158. See, e.g., Miranda, 523 F.3d at 1038-39. The court "recognize[d] ... that the mean-
ing of legislative history, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder." Id. at 1039.
159. See SUP. CT. R. 10. The Supreme Court grants or denies writs of certiorari with
reference to three "compelling reasons" to hear a case. Id. The reasons for granting certio-
rari include "important federal questions" and any combination of splits between the fed-
eral appellate courts or the highest state courts. Id.
160. BLAcK's LAw DiCTIONARY 784 (9th ed. 2009). Under the definition of "hard case":
"A lawsuit involving equities that tempt a judge to stretch or even disregard a principle of
law at issue. Hence the expression, 'Hard cases make bad law."' Id.
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A. Successful Statutory Interpret ation
There is no doubt that illegal immigration carries with it serious
consequences for the nation,161 but statutory interpretation tran-
scends immigration alone because it affects every offense falling
under a particular statute.162 To that end, the interpretation in
Flores will be quoted in the future as common sense approach to
interpretation of criminal statutes. Indeed, the opinion's clarity
and decisiveness will make it a formidable sword (or shield) for
future litigants.
The Court in Flores, in keeping with its straightforward and
understandable approach, decisively demonstrated that laws can
be properly reviewed with an ordinary look to the English lan-
guage as the practical starting and ending point.163 Due to the
fact that the ordinary interpretation of criminal statutes generally
comports with grammatical rules, the Court was able to dispose of
the case on clear and reasonably objective grounds. 164 A phrase
such as "knowingly," which precedes and introduces the portions
of a criminal law, is normally interpreted as applying to every
word of the statute. 65 There was no indication, structural or oth-
erwise, that the introductory knowledge requirement should be
unusually restricted.
It is difficult to imagine arbitrarily cutting off the reach of
"knowingly" after only the first few words of the offense. Addi-
tionally, once it is admitted that stopping the term's reach so early
would be absurd, it is even more difficult to find a logical place to
stop its effect prior to the end of the sentence. Once the knowl-
161. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976) ("Interdicting
the flow of illegal entrants from Mexico poses formidable law enforcement problems.") (em-
phasis added); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-79 (1975) ("[A]liens
create significant economic and social problems, competing with citizens and legal resident
aliens for jobs, and generating extra demand for social services. The aliens themselves are
vulnerable to exploitation because they cannot complain of substandard working conditions
without risking deportation.").
162. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989). The Court
noted the importance of statutory interpretation, especially for subsequent cases, by noting
"that the burden borne by the party advocating the abandonment of an established prece-
dent is greater where the Court is asked to overrule a point of statutory construction. Con-
siderations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for
here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is impli-
cated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done." Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172-
73.
163. Id. at 1890. The Court found "strong textual reasons for rejecting the Government's
position" and looked at ordinary English usage. Id.
164. Id. at 1890-91.
165. Id. at 1891.
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edge requirement begins to wander past the introductory verbs,
the period is its only reasonable stopping point.
With the bulk of analysis centering on relatively definite Eng-
lish writing maxims, the Court avoided extensively delving into
the wealth of legislative history that usually accompanies federal
laws. 166 The credibility of an opinion is enhanced immensely when
a reader can step away and declare "it just makes sense." Any
contrary reading of the aggravated identity theft statute would
require a stretching of ordinary grammar and the expenditure of
vital political capital.
The grammatical analysis even pleased the outspoken textualist
Justice Scalia. 67 Even though Justice Scalia disapproved of the
Court's analysis beyond the plain text, 68 it is still quite an acco-
lade for a textual inquiry to satisfy the strict standards of the Jus-
tice.' 69 The majority was convincing enough with just its review of
the text, that Justice Scalia would have ended the opinion even
more promptly than the majority did.' 70
Ultimately, Flores exemplified a more impartial and definite
process of statutory interpretation as opposed to the confusing and
seemingly biased employment of alternative sources of construc-
tion utilized by lower courts. A simplistic approach, coupled with
an understandable analysis supported by the employment of Eng-
lish grammar rules and linguistic common sense, exemplified the
Court's correct textual interpretation of the aggravated identity
theft statute.
B. Public Policy Success
As Justice Alito persuasively noted, if the Court refused to ex-
tend the knowledge requirement for aggravated identity theft,
convictions would be based predominantly on chance.' 7' Rolling
the dice and playing the odds do not foster public respect for the
judicial process. Rather, certainty, demonstrable fault, and actual
166. Id. at 1892-93. The Court concluded that the statutory history was inconclusive
overall. Id. at 1892.
167. Flores, 129 S. Ct. at 1894 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia agreed that
"[ojrdinary English usage supports [the majority's] reading." Id.
168. Id. Justice Scalia noted that the Court "is not content to stop at the statute's text,
and I do not join that further portion of the Court's opinion." Id.
169. See generally ANTONIN ScALiA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 9-41 (1997).
170. Id. at 1895. Noting that "[tlhe statute's text is clear, and I would reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals on that ground alone." Id.
171. Id. at 1896 (Auito, J., concurring).
Winter 2010 167
168 ~Duquesne Law ReviewVo.4
wrongdoing should be notions that the public perceives when ex-
amining the functions of the judiciary. It is only then that the
words inscribed above the main entrance to the Supreme Court
building, "Equal Justice Under Law," 72 have any real meaning.
Without extension of the knowledge requirement, if the gov-
ernment discovers that the information the immigrant used be-
longed to another person, then a mandatory two-year prison sen-
tence would be added to his underlying immigration offenses. 73
Alternatively, an apprehended foreign national would be subject
only to other offenses of varying incarceration lengths if he fortui-
tously chose information which did not yet belong to an American.
Both alternatives, in the prospect of employment, income, and lib-
erty in the United States, are consequences that the immigrant
would gladly risk. Basing incarcerations merely on chance also
does not foster the public confidence necessary to the proper work-
ings of the judiciary. 74 With a definite interpretation of the stat-
utes, prosecutors can end the game of chance against immigrants
and employ a truly practical enforcement method.
Furthermore, many immigrants care more about attaining a
better life for themselves and their families than whether or not
the information they use for employment already belonged to an-
other person.175 Many times they are not using the information to
intentionally harm either. 76 Immigrants will reside in the murky
arenas of chance and ignore whether the information they possess
hit in the identification lottery already. Without a definitely de-
fined offense and mens rea requirement, many of the difficulties
surrounding immigration would remain. With the extension of
172. Supreme Court of the United States, The Court and Constitutional Interpretation,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/aboutkconstitutional.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
174. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157-58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Bush is a
recent example, as stated by Justice Breyer in his dissent, of the Court's own general rec-
ognition that its power is dependent on support of the people: "[C]onfidence is a public
treasure. It has been built slowly over many years some of which were marked by a Civil
War and the tragedy of segregation. It is a vitally necessary ingredient of any successful
effort to protect basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself." Bush, 531 U.S. at 157-58.
175. See Mlores, 129 S. Ct. at 1893. The Court noted that in immigration cases it is
possible that "a defendant knew the papers were not his. But perhaps the defendant did
not care whether the papers (1) were real papers belonging to another person or (2) were
simply counterfeit papers." Id.
176. Adam Liptak & Julia Preston, Justices Limit Use of Identity Theft Law in Immigra-
tion Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2009, at A17. In the article, Chuck Roth, litigation director
at the National Immigrant Justice Center in Chicago states that "[t]he court's ruling pre-
serves basic ideals of fairness for some of our society's most vulnerable workers. . .. An
immigrant who uses a false Social Security number to get a job doesn't intend to harm
anyone, and it makes no sense to spend our tax dollars to imprison them for two years." Id.
168 Vol. 48
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the knowledge requirement, immigration enforcement measures
already thinly stretched can be directed at those actually causing
the most harm. The immigrants who use information knowing it
to be stolen are the real threats for identity theft and other wrongs
reaching beyond unlawful access into the country. The statute
was created to combat the growing threat of identity theft, and the
majority's decision furthers this goal. 177
In addition, with 792,000 foreign nationals apprehended in 2008
alone, and close to ninety percent of the arrests of individuals from
Mexico, illegal immigration has become a serious concern on the
southwest border of the United States. 78 Apprehensions by the
Department of Homeland Security have decreased over the past
few years, but the problem is still prevalent. 79 The aggravated
identity theft statute became a "favorite tool for prosecutors" in
many immigration cases. 180 Government agents could threaten to
impose the additional two-year mandatory sentence of aggravated
identity theft unless the illegal workers pled guilty to lesser of-
fenses. 8 1 There is an inherent unfairness in the situation, the
severity of illegal immigration notwithstanding. Many immi-
grants do not intend to cause serious harm 82 and they often per-
form necessary jobs that many Americans traditionally shy away
from. Illegal immigration can now be combated, without exploita-
tion of the individuals, while still retaining ideas of patriotism and
safe borders.
There is no doubt that the foreign nationals in many federal
immigration raids are indeed acting illegally, but they should still
be afforded the fairness that has become the cornerstone of Ameri-
can jurisprudence. Regardless of the benefits and downfalls inter-
twined into the illegal immigration scheme, the individuals in-
177. 81 AM.JUR. 3D Proof of Facts §113, §10 (2009).
178. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2008 1 (2009),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement-ar_08.pdf.
179. Id.
180. Liptak & Preston, supra note 176.
181. Id. One of the most widespread uses of the prosecution tool was at a meatpacking
plant in Iowa in May 2008. Id. "Nearly 300 unauthorized immigrant workers from the
plant, most of them from Guatemala, pleaded guilty to document-fraud charges rather than
risk being convicted at trial of the identity-theft charge." Id. In most of the cases from
Iowa, the prosecutors were only able to establish "that the Social Security numbers and
immigration documents the workers had presented were false." Id.
182. Id. "Chuck Roth, litigation director at the National Immigrant Justice Center in
Chicago [stated that 'aln immigrant who uses a false Social Security number to get a job
doesn't intend to harm anyone, and it makes no sense to spend our tax dollars to imprison
them for two years." Id.
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volved are still human and deserve a basic level of just treatment
under the federal criminal code. Eliminating an abusive tool of
prosecutors to elicit possibly incorrect or coercive guilty pleas is
inconsistent with notions of fairness and justice.
The cases throughout the circuits exemplified that most of the
litigation over the aggravated identity theft offense did indeed in-
volve immigrants. 183 As noted above, the identity is a means to a
legitimate end in the minds of many immigrants. Any damage
that is sustained by the citizen is an ancillary consequence not
necessarily contemplated by the actors. 84 If Congress intends to
penalize such action by illegal immigrants, they can alter the
statute to expressly reflect such a goal. Congress will have the
chance to reform the law if the Supreme Court's ruling does not
comport with their intentions.
Also, the Obama Administration publicized that it will shift the
focal point of immigration enforcement to the employers who
abuse the immigration system. 85 Employers who intentionally
employ illegal immigrants in order to decrease costs through lower
wages could become the next primary target in immigration en-
force ment.186 Ultimately, illegal immigration is a problem that
can be combated without oppressive prosecutorial and enforce-
ment techniques, which are aided by a more certain aggravated
identity theft statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's conclusion in Flores was a beneficial rul-
ing for illegal immigrants, an emasculation of the federal prosecu-
tor's favorite tool in many immigration cases, and most of all, a
step forward in statutory interpretation. With clear and concise
reasoning, Flores set forth a standard that should be mirrored by
lower courts. Flores represents a relatively small obstruction for
prosecutors who are already armed with a wealth of weapons to
catch and charge perpetrators. Conversely, the Court's decision
183. See Mlores, 129 S. Ct. at 1893. The widespread litigation involving immigrants may
be due to the fact that "in the classic case of identity theft, intent is generally not difficult
to prove. For example, where a defendant has used another person's identification infor-
mation to get access to that person's bank account, the Government can prove knowledge
with little difficulty." Id. In other instances such as "dumpster diving, computer hacking,
and the like . .. intent should be relatively easy to prove, and there will be no practical
enforcement problem." Id.
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represents a significant leap forward for enhanced certainty in
judicial interpretation of knowledge requirements and increased
predictability for corresponding punishments in federal criminal
statutes.
Michael J. Joyce

